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CThe global prescription medicines industry argues that it needs high
prices for new medicines to meet ever-increasing development costs.
While many payers are prepared to pay high prices if they represent
good value for money, they first need to feel assured that the value for
money estimates are robust. Insofar as new medicines enter the mar-
ket with limited and uncertain data relating to their performance in
normal clinical practice, the value for money case for some medicines
maywell be driven largely by assumptions than by empirical evidence.
The concern to manufacturers is that payers respond to this uncer-
tainty by listing the product at a lower price (whichmay not satisfy the
producer) or not listing the product until more evidence is available
(which may not satisfy clinicians and patients). Is there a solution that
will satisfy all key stakeholders? Will clinicians and patients continue
to have timely access to new medicines and will payers have sustain- O
lla, N
al So
oi:10.1016/j.jval.2012.02.004ble reimbursement systems? Will the industry continue to be re-
arded with high prices for new medicines so long as they represent
ood value for money?
n 2011, the Australian Government introduced a managed entry
chemewhereby the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committeewill
ecommend the listing of a new medicine at a price justified by the
xisting evidence, pending the availability ofmore conclusive evidence
f cost-effectiveness to support its continued listing at a higher price.
his commentary examines the Australian Government’s managed
ntry scheme and issues that are likely to arise from its implementa-
ion.
eywords: Australia, decision making.
opyright © 2012, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
The global prescription medicines industry argues that it needs
high prices for its new medicines to meet ever-increasing devel-
opment costs [1]. In some instances, the prices of new medicines
are beyond individual patients’ willingness or ability to pay. As a
consequence, third-party payers (i.e., governments and other in-
stitutions) are under continual pressure to provide their constitu-
ents with timely access to newmedicines. While many payers are
prepared to pay high prices if a product represents “good value for
money,” they first need to be satisfied that the estimates of value
for money are robust and reasonable. Insofar as new medicines
enter themarketwith limited anduncertain clinical and economic
data relating to their performance in normal clinical practice, the
value for money case for some medicines may well be driven
largely by assumptions than by empirical evidence. The concern
to manufacturers is that payers respond to the uncertainty by
recommending listing at a lower price (which may not satisfy the
producer) or not recommend listing until more evidence becomes
available (whichmay not satisfy clinicians and patients). Is there a
solution that will satisfy all the key stakeholders, that is, one in
which clinicians and patients continue to have timely access to
new medicines, payers continue to have sustainable reimburse-
ment systems, and the pharmaceutical industry continues to be
* Address correspondence to: Michael Wonder, PO Box 470, Cronu
E-mail: mwonder@optusnet.com.au.
098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2012, Internation
ublished by Elsevier Inc.rewarded with high prices for newmedicines (so long as they rep-
resent good value for money)?
In 2010, the Australian Government and the local pharma-
ceutical industry announced that they had reached an agree-
ment on the establishment of a managed entry scheme (MES)
that would attempt to satisfy the needs of the key stakeholders.
The basis of the scheme is that a product will be listed at a price
commensurate with it being cost-effective based on the evi-
dence existing at launch. Thereafter, the price of the product
will be adjusted (upward or downward) on the basis of cost-
effectiveness estimates arising from the generation of further
randomized clinical trial (RCT) evidence (postlaunch). This new
and innovative policy initiative is likely to be of considerable
interest to stakeholders in other jurisdictions who have to deal
with the same issues as well as the international ramifications
of reimbursement policies in Australia. The purpose of this ar-
ticle was to examine the Australian MES and issues that are
likely to arise from its implementation.
A Framework for Managed Entry
OnMay 6, 2010, the Federal Minister for Health andAgeing and the
Chair of Medicines Australia, which represents the local medi-
cines industry, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to
ensure that all Australians have access to a wide range of subsi-
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the best possible prices [2].
The PBS provides timely, reliable, and affordable access to nec-
essary medicines for Australians [3]. The PBS is part of the Austra-
lian Government’s National Medicines Policy [4]. Under the PBS,
the government subsidizes the cost ofmedicines formostmedical
conditions. Submissions to list new medicines are evaluated by
the Pharmaceutical Evaluation Section before consideration by
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC). The
PBAC has produced guidelines for preparing submissions [5]. The
PBAC is an independent expert body whose membership includes
doctors, other health professionals, and a consumer representa-
tive [6].
When reviewing a submission to list amedicine on the PBS, the
PBAC takes into account the medical conditions for which the
medicine has been approved for use in Australia by the Therapeu-
tic Goods Administration (TGA) aswell as its clinical effectiveness,
safety, and cost-effectiveness (value for money) compared with
other treatments. The Minister of Health and Ageing can list a
medicine on the PBS only on a recommendation to do so from the
PBAC [6].
TheMoU sets forth provisions that “will help sustain the PBS by
delivering estimated savings of AU$1.9 billion (US$1.87 billion).”
The savings will be achieved through the expansion of price re-
form policies introduced in 2007 by the previous government and
include expanded arrangements for price disclosure fromOctober
1, 2010, and increased statutory price reductions from February 1,
2011. The MoU will provide some pricing certainty to the innova-
tive pharmaceutical industry and will assist in cutting red tape
and improve the time taken to list newmedicines on the PBS. After
the recent federal election, both political parties agreed that the
MoUwould be effective from the date of its execution until June 30,
2014 [7].
Of particular interest in this article are clauses 26 and 27 of the
MoU, which relate to the development of a MES for the listing of
(certain) new medicines; these are reproduced in Figure 1.
The MES is the result of ongoing discussion between PBAC and
the Department of Health andAgeing (DoHA)withmembers of the
local medicines industry to enhance the quality and strength of
Clause 26. "From 1 January 2011, the Com
whereby the PBAC may recommend PBS cov
pending submission of more conclusive evid
drug at a higher price. The PBAC will provid
specific evidence required to support a subse
Clause 27. It is agreed that the application
submissions  where  the  PBAC  agrees  tha
and when:
- the PBAC would not otherwise recomm
because the extent or value of the clinica
- there is a randomised clinical trial (o
report within a reasonable timeframe
identified area of uncertainty.
The parties note that this does not preclude 
(e.g. risk-sharing agreements) where approp
Fig. 1 – Clauses 26 and 27 of the memorandum of understan
Australia. PBAC, Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committthe evidence provided by applicants (i.e., members of the localmedicines industry) to the PBAC to support their submissions to
list new medicines on the PBS.
The local medicines industry has been pursuing improved PBS
listing arrangements, such as anMES, for some time. The industry
has agreed to further price reductions for their existing medicines
in the MoU to improve their chances of being able to list their new
medicines.
The introduction of the MES is one of a number of activities
between the government and the pharmaceutical industry to
identify and address areas of clinical, economic, and/or financial
uncertainty associated with new medicines. Some of the recent
activities undertaken to address clinical and economic uncer-
tainty include horizon scanning, meetings between the national
regulator (TGA), the PBAC Secretariat, and individual pharmaceu-
tical companies to discuss the design of phase III clinical trials, the
development of parallel registration (TGA) and reimbursement
(PBAC) processes, and the enhanced postmarket monitoring of
medicines [8,9].
Risk-sharing agreements have been used by the DoHA, os-
tensibly administered by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing
Authority, for many years as a tool to manage the financial
uncertainty surrounding the listing of new medicines on the
PBS. As the Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority notes in
its 2010 annual report: “Increasingly, the PBPA considers deeds
of agreement containing risk sharing arrangements to contain
overall costs of drugs on the PBS and to manage the financial
risks to the Government resulting from uncertainty about drugs
utilization. At 30 June 2010, there were 90 deeds of agreement in
place or in development” [10].
In February 2011, the DoHA released a framework for the intro-
duction of an MES for submissions to the PBAC for the listing of a
new medicine on the PBS. [8] A submission will be considered by
he PBAC for an MES under the following conditions:
. The PBAC accepts that there is a high clinical need for the pro-
posedmedicine in the indication requested by the sponsor. The
consideration of clinical need would involve an assessment of
the prevalence and severity of the disease, whether alternative
therapies are available, and the extent to which the proposed
ealth undertakes to introduce a mechanism 
 at a price justified by the existing evidence,
f cost-effectiveness to support listing of the 
ce in relation to sources of uncertainty and
 application.
is mechanism will initially be restricted to 
e  is  a  clinical  need  for  the  intervention,
the listing of the drug at the proposed price 
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588 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 8 6 – 5 9 02. The PBAC considers that new clinical data will resolve the is-
sues of uncertainty in relation to the extent or value of the
clinical effect, whichwould have otherwise prevented an initial
positive recommendation. For the (RCT)-basedMES, thismeans
that a trial protocol is available for the consideration of the
PBAC at the time of the original submission and that the PBAC is
satisfied that the results will be available within a reasonable
time frame (such as the period covered by the deed of agree-
ment [DoA], usually 4 years) to enable the reporting of results
aimed at resolving the outstanding area(s) of uncertainty, not-
ing that, in the future, theremay also be other circumstances in
which other non-RCT–level evidence may be appropriate, such
as data collection for the purpose of confirming cost-offsets in
economic analyses).
. Implementation will be via a confidential DoA between the
sponsor and the government, as an administrative tool to
ensure clear understanding by all parties of the obligations
under the MES framework and to ensure that the proposal, if
adopted, is being used in conjunction with other existing
tools designed to manage the entry of a new medicine, as
appropriate[11].
. Any subsequent reviewby the PBACof the evidence specified by
the DoAwould also include a consideration of all other relevant
evidence at that time, including evidence from any Risk Man-
agement Plan where mandated by the TGA.
he framework does not state whowill propose a listing under the
ES. A sponsor could ask the PBAC to list a newmedicine under a
ES; this is unlikely to happen in the initial submission because it
ay request a PBS listing at a high price as its initial strategy.
here are no details as yet on the MES in the PBAC guidelines.
As part of the initial MES submission, the PBAC will consider
the usual clinical and economic evidence available when it re-
views the initial submission, as well as the additional section in
the submission dedicated to the provision of additional evidence
in a resubmission under the MES framework.
Such a thorough and comprehensive submission package is
intended to enable the PBAC to do the following:
1. Make a positive recommendation based on current evidence at
a price it considers acceptable in view of the evidence available
at the time of the initial submission.
. Identify the key areas of uncertainty for decisionmaking (which
may or may not be identical to the uncertainties identified in
Table 1 – Specifications of a deed of agreement.
Sponsor Go
The time frame for the resubmission Areas of uncerta
value of the cl
PBAC (or other
Guarantee of supply at the original price in
the event that the additional RCT results
(or other non-RCT results in the future) fail
to produce satisfactory evidence
A statement of in
the submissio
evidence beco
anticipated m
effect (or othe
circumstances
A commitment to disclose information in the
resubmission about anticipated/
unanticipated changes that have an
impact on the extent or value of the
clinical effect (or other circumstances in
the future) or evidence, e.g., the company
may opt for a different/modified economic
model
ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; PBAC, Pharmaceutical Benthe submission by the sponsor).While a future price cannot be specified or guaranteed at the time
of the initial listing, the PBAC, in line with its practice of making
consistent and reasonable decisions, will reconsider a managed
entry resubmission and a price change in the event that the iden-
tified uncertainties are resolved by the additional clinical data [8].
A DoA will be used to manage/share the risk associated with a
anaged entry listing. Table 1 outlines what needs to be specified
n a DoA.
The following information will be disclosed in a PBAC Public
ummary Document and published on the DoHA Web site:
. The successful submission/package as amanaged entry type of
submission
. The uncertainties identified at the time of the initial consider-
ation by the PBAC
. The time frame for resubmission to the PBAC
Public Summary Document associated with the resubmission
ould note the subsequent evidence as agreed under the DoA and
ny other available evidence considered by the PBAC. Information
onsistentwith the commercial-in-confidence framework andun-
ublished data will not be included in the Public Summary Docu-
ents [8,12].
Concerns About the Proposed MES in Australia
Inclusion of stakeholders
Insofar as the PBS has many stakeholders, it has been argued that
theMoU should have beenmore inclusive.While the GenericMed-
icines Industry Association, the body that represents the local ge-
neric prescription medicines industry, was not a co-signatory of
the MoU and has been a vocal critic of it, there are no signs to
indicate that it has anymajor objections to clauses 26 and 27. This
is not unexpected given the members of the Generic Medicines
Industry Association are unlikely sponsors of newmedicines [13].
While clauses 26 and 27 confer certain obligations on it, the
PBAC was also not a co-signatory. It could be argued that PBAC’s
interests were represented by the minister and DoHA, despite the
fact that the PBAC was established as an independent committee.
The introduction of an MES is essentially a policy issue, and it is
not PBAC’s role to determine policy. Nonetheless, its implementa-
ment/PBAC Both
bout the magnitude or
effect identified by the
mstances in the future)
Agreed initial price
by the PBAC to reconsider
e the additional RCT
vailable to support the
ude or value of the clinical
-RCT evidence for other
e future)
An acknowledgment that there
may be other areas of
uncertainty yet to be identified
that could impact on the initial
ICER
A customized renegotiation clause
acknowledging managed entry
as a trigger (currently, a change
in the ICER or an increase in
price is a trigger for
renegotiation); however, an
explicit, generic managed entry
clause could be added instead
Advisory Committee; RCT, randomized clinical trial.vern
inty a
inical
circu
tent
n onc
mes a
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in thtionmaywell present some procedural challenges that could have
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the MoU.
Sufficient and sustainable for the PBAC?
While the introduction of an MES is a new policy option, is it the
best possible solution to the problem? The evidence requirements
of the PBAChave existed for almost 20 years, and the international
prescription medicines industry has been somewhat reluctant to
respond fully to the requirements. It does not necessarily make
sense for a manufacturer to do so if the evidence requirements of
the PBAC are unique. But recent developments indicate that this is
not the case. The industry’s focus has shifted from “why” to
“what” additional evidence should be generated and “when.” It
could be argued that the relevant clinical evidence should be gen-
erated in phase III rather than in phase IV as implied in the MoU.
Such criticisms may be founded in some instances but not in oth-
ers; the expectation that all phase III clinical trials should be final
outcomes trials is perhaps an unrealistic one. Nonetheless, other
ongoing local and international developments, such as early payer
engagement, should lead to an improved understanding on what
clinical evidence can and should be produced in the pivotal phase
III clinical trials [9].
The MES is different to a procedure the PBAC has used from
time to time to facilitate the initial and ongoing PBS listing of cer-
tain newmedicines. In 2001, the initial submission to list imatinib
on the PBS for patients with chronic myeloid leukemia in the
chronic phase who had failed treatment with interferon- was
supported by the results from an uncontrolled phase II study with
a surrogate measure, the proportion of patients who achieved a
major cytogenetic response after 12 months, as the primary out-
come measure [14]. The PBAC was concerned about the uncer-
tainty surrounding the relationship between the surrogate mea-
sure and survival and thus the estimated (modeled) incremental
gain in survival with imatinib over its comparator, hydroxyurea.
[15]. The listing of imatinib was delayed while the PBAC sought
further evidence and advice to validate major cytogenetic re-
sponse as a surrogate measure as well as further survival data
from the ongoing phase II study. The availability of an MES could
have facilitated its earlier listing. It is also different to the PBS
listing of bosentan for patients with pulmonary arterial hyperten-
sion in 2004 where the source of evidence on its clinical perfor-
mance to support its continued listing was a local patient registry
[16,17].
Some key elements, such as “high clinical need” and “fit-for-
purpose evidence,” have not been defined andmay be disputed. In
the end, the PBAC will be the judge. The initial deed will need to
consider all possible clinical scenarios. Clause 27 indicates that the
main focus is likely to be themagnitude of the incremental clinical
effect (i.e., efficacy).
There is nomention in the framework onwhether the compar-
ator in the clinical trials needs to be a current relevant active treat-
ment or whether placebo will be acceptable. Likewise there is no
mention on whether the trial should be designed/powered for su-
periority or noninferiority. It is reasonable to assume that active
comparator trials designed for superiority will be more suited to
an MES and thus be acceptable to the PBAC.
While not explicitly stated, it is likely that the evidence pro-
vided in the initial submission to support the listing of the medi-
cine will be on an acceptable surrogate outcome whereas the evi-
dence provided in the resubmission to support the medicine’s
continued listing will be on a payer-relevant (i.e., final) outcome.
There could be some initial challenges if the PBAC is not that fa-
miliar with the surrogate outcome or has been inclined not to
accept it in the past for other medicines.
Problemsmay also arise if the results from the relevant clinical
trial indicate a different comparative safety profile (i.e., there areunforeseen safety issues) and an unexpected risk:benefit trade-off
will need to be made.
Reasonable for industry?
The MES is likely to be an option only for the sponsors of certain
new medicines, that is, those that will be used long term (either
continuously or intermittently) to treat patients with chronic dis-
eases where it is unreasonable to expect long-term outcomes data
at the time of an initial PBAC submission. Like the imatinib exam-
ple, a crucial issue may be the acceptance by the PBAC of the
surrogate measure from the phase III trial. The difference here is
that the resubmission will be supported by data from a proper
outcomes trial rather than by longer-term follow-up data from the
phase III trial. The 2008 Surrogate to Final Outcomes Working
Group report to the PBAC noted that the task of evaluating surro-
gate measures does not have a simple solution. Nonetheless, the
Surrogate to Final Outcomes Working Group developed an evi-
dence framework and agreed that some guidance can be given
regarding the relative importance of the different dimensions in
the framework, with not all dimensions contributing equally to
the overall assessment. In the framework, randomized trial data is
rated more highly (i.e., provides stronger support) than nonran-
domized data [18].
Sponsors will need to give serious thought as to when to re-
quest consideration of an MES. Should they request this when
submitting their initial submission or later if and when the sub-
mission hits challenges after evaluation by the Pharmaceutical
Evaluation Section to the point that there is a real risk that the
submission will be rejected by the PBAC? Why would a sponsor
propose a low price for a new medicine upfront without having
received any feedback on how the submission has fared? An MES
submission might not be subject to cost-recovery measures if it
meets the current exemption criteria [19].
Will it impact prices?
Sponsors will probably agree to an initial “low” price for a new
medicine only if they are satisfied that there is a reasonable
chance that they will be able to achieve a fairer (higher) price after
the supply of the results from the clinical trial to the PBAC in a
resubmission. While it will not be possible for the DoA to state
exactly what price will be offered, it will need to be reasonably
clear on this.
Sponsors will agree to an initial “low” price for a newmedicine
only if they are sufficiently confident that it will not have an effect
on its price in other countries through international reference
pricing. Confidence will be higher if the initial price is not publicly
disclosed.
The results from the clinical trial may indicate a price reduc-
tion rather than a price increase. There is no discussion in DoHA’s
MES framework on this scenario. It is not clear what sponsors
would do here. Provisional listings are not possible under the cur-
rent legislation. If the trial shows that the medicine performs
poorer than expected, then a price decreasemay well be sought. If
the results indicate a benefit only in a particular patient subgroup,
then themedicine’s continued listing (at any price) for this patient
subgroup is a possibility; this will probably occur only if the sub-
group has been prespecified in the clinical trials protocol. If the
government and medicine’s sponsor cannot agree on the actual
price decrease (this should be considered in the DoA), then the
medicine will probably be delisted. (The formal procedure is that
PBAC make a recommendation to delist for the minister to con-
sider.)
Competitive effects on industry
A subsequent initial submission fromanother sponsor seeking the
listing of a different medicine to treat patients with the same dis-
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have the potential to alter the extent of future clinical need but not
the health gain. The first medicine will have the requisite clinical
trial underway, whereas the competitor might not have a similar
ongoing RCT. There could be several possibilities. For example, the
competitor medicine may have
1. Data on the surrogate measure that supported the listing of the
first medicine with an ongoing clinical trial that will provide
similar evidence in the resubmission for the first medicine.
. Data on the surrogate measure that supported the listing of the
first medicine with an ongoing clinical trial. The application to
the PBAC would be based on a cost-minimization analysis in
comparison with the first medicine by way of the surrogate
outcome.
. Data on a final outcome.
he price of the second medicine will be determined by using the
sual criteria; the key drivers will be the comparability of the two
edicines and the degree of confidence the PBACwould have that
he incremental modeled health/quality-adjusted life-year gain
or the firstmedicine in its initial submission and confirmed by the
upply of RCT data in a resubmission could be extrapolated to the
econd medicine to maintain the cost-minimization analysis of
he initial submission.
Better access for clinicians and patients
Continued timely access to newmedicines is a goal of theMES that
is shared by all stakeholders. There is no agreed local definition of
“timely access.” One approach could be to measure the time from
the initial PBAC submission to PBS listing. It is not possible to
measure this now for new medicines given submission dates are
not made public. Nonetheless, they can be inferred with reason-
able accuracy. It is unclear what level of improvement of access
would be seen as being meaningful.
Protracted discussions on some of the finer points of the DoA
may result in delayed listing/access. Key aspects of the DoA will
not be made public, and so one will not be able to determine what
the cause(s) of the delay is. Because all deeds are confidential,
there will not be a learning effect for other sponsors whomight be
interested in the MES concept.
International considerations
The MES is yet another interesting Australian health care policy
experiment. The specific dual requirements for high-level (i.e.,
RCT) clinical evidence and a low initial price with an explicit
mechanism for a potential price increase on the basis of the RCT
evidence indicate an operating model that is novel. It is too
early to speculate on its likely acceptance and use. It may be an
option that payers in other jurisdictions could implement, once
suitably contextualized for their local conditions. Payers around
the world will no doubt keenly follow the early experiences of
the MES in Australia.
Conclusion
The MES framework looks promising on paper, but the real prob-
lems may surface only in its implementation. It may well spark a
lot of interest butmight engage only a few takers in the short term.
There are no examples to date. Local and international observers
might not be able to learn that much from the players given the
key aspects of any MES are likely to be locked up in a DoA.R E F E R E N C E S
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